J. F. Bell, Brigadier-general Commanding.

In other words, the military authorities took whole provinces of people apparently pursuing their ordinary avocations, and undertook by every form of oppression -- burning their houses, destroying their food, confining them within certain zones, confiscating their property, imprisoning them, or forcing them to work -- to make them active agents on our side in this war of conquest.

What General Bell actually did is shown by his report made the day after Christmas:

Batangas, Dec. 26, 1901.

I have become convinced that within two months at the outside there will be no more insurrection in this brigade. We may not have secured all the guns or caught all the insurgents by that time, and the present insurrection will end and the men and the guns will be secured in time.... I am practically sure they cannot remain here in Batangas, Laguna, and a part of Tayabas. The people are now assembled in the towns, with all the visible food supply except that cached by insurgents in the mountains. For the next six days all station commanders will be employed hunting insurgents and their hidden food supplies within their respective jurisdictions. Population of each town will be turned out, and all transportation that can be found impressed to bring into government storehouses all food that is found, if it be possible to transport it. If not, it will be destroyed.

I am now assembling in the neighborhood of twenty-five hundred men, who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I expect to accompany the command. Of course, no such strength is necessary to cope with all the insurgents in the Phillipine Islands, but the country is indescribably rough and badly cut up.... To the ravines and mountains I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley, and mountain-peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of towns. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured. Old men, women, and children will be sent to towns. This movement begins January 1, by which time I hope to have nearly all the food supply in the towns. If insurgents hide their guns and come into the towns, it will be to my advantage; for I shall put such a pressure on town officials and police that they will be compelled to identify insurgents. If I catch these, I shall get their guns in time. I expect to first clean out the wide Loboo Peninsula south of Bantangas, Tiasan, and San Juan de Boc Boc road. I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the country westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning through Lipa.

I shall scour and clean up the Lipa Mountains. Swinging northward, the country in the vicinity of San Pablo, Alaminos, Tananan, and Santo Tomas, will be scoured, ending at Mount Maguiling, which will then be thoroughly searched and devastated. This is said to be the home of Malvar and his parents.

Swinging back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the country of which Mount Cristobal and Mount Banabao are the main peaks. These two mountains, Mount Maguiling, and the mountains north-east of Loboo are the main haunts of the insurgents. After the 1st of January no one will be permitted to move about without a pass....

These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense, and they should have it for the good of all concerned. Sixto Lopez is now interested in peace because I have in jail all the male members of his family found in my jurisdiction, and have seized his houses and palay and his steamer.

Let us see now what General Smith's orders were.

The following was issued after Major Waller and others had been at work for some time, as General Smith took command October 10, and Major Waller's report of burning one hundred and sixty-five villages was dated November 23:

[Circular No. 6.]

Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade,

Tacloban, Leyte, P.I, Dec. 24,1901.

To All Station Commanders:

The brigade commander has become thoroughly convinced from the great mass of evidence at hand that the insurrection for some time past and still in force in the island of Samar has been supported solely by the people who live in the pueblos ostensibly pursuing their peaceful pursuits and enjoying American protection, and that this is especially true in regard to the "pudientes," or wealthy class.

He is and for some time past has been satisfied that the people themselves, and especially this wealthy and influential class, can stop this insurrection at any time they make up their minds to do so; that up to the present time they do not want peace; that they are working in every way and to the utmost of their ability to prevent peace. He is satisfied that this class, while openly talking peace, is doing so simply to gain the confidence of our officers and soldiers, only to betray them to the insurrectos, or, in short, that while ostensibly aiding the Americans, they are in reality secretly doing everything in their power to support and maintain this insurrection.

Under such conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is to adopt the policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for the war to cease, -- a desire or longing so intense, so personal especially to every individual of the class mentioned, and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to bringing about a state of real peace, that will impel them to join hands with the Americans in the accomplishment of this end.

The policy to be pursued in this brigade, from this time on, will be to wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible. This policy will apply to the island of Samar and such other portions of the brigade to which it may become necessary to apply it, even though such territory is supposedly peaceful or is under civil government.

In waging this warfare, officers of this brigade are directed and expected to co-operate to their utmost, so as to terminate this war as soon as practicable, since short severe wars are the most humane in the end. No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a humanitarian basis. In waging this war, officers will be guided by the provisions of General Orders, No. 100, Adjutant-general's Office, 1863, which order promulgates the instructions for the government of the armies of the United States in the field. (Copies of this order will be furnished to the troops of this brigade as soon as practicable. In the mean time commanding officers will personally see to it that the younger and less experienced officers of the command are instructed in the provisions of this order, wherever it is possible to do so.)

Commanding officers are earnestly requested and expected to exercise, without reference to these headquarters, their own discretion in the adoption of any and all measures of warfare coming within the provisions of this general order which will tend to accomplish the desired results in the most direct way or in the shortest possible space of time. They will also encourage the younger officers of their commands to constantly look for, engage, harass, and annoy the enemy in the field; and to this end commanding officers will repose a large amount of confidence in these subordinate officers, and will permit to them a large latitude of action and a discretion similar to that herein conferred upon the commanding officers of stations by these headquarters.

In dealing with the natives of all classes, officers will be guided by the following principles:

First. Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or barrios, will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend. This he cannot do by mere words or promises, nor by imparting information which, while true, is old or stale and of no value; nor can it be done by aiding us in ways that do no material harm to the insurgents. In short, the only manner in which the native can demonstrate his loyalty is by some positive act or acts that actually and positively commit him to us, thereby severing his relations with the insurrectos and producing or tending to produce distinctively unfriendly relations with the insurgents.

Not only the ordinary natives, but especially those of influence and position in the pueblos, who manifestly and openly cultivate friendly relations with the Americans, will be regarded with particular suspicion, since by the announced policy of the insurgent government their ablest and most stanch friends or those who are capable of most skillfully practising duplicity are selected and directed to cultivate the friendship of American officers, so as to obtain their confidence, and to secretly communicate to the insurgents everything that the Americans do or contemplate doing, particularly with regard to the movement of troops. In a word, friendship for the Americans on the part of any native will be measured directly and solely by his acts; and neither sentiment nor social reasons of any kind will be permitted to enter into the determination of such friendship.

Second. It will be regarded as a certainty that all officials of the pueblos and barrios are likewise officials of Lukban and his officers, or at least that they are in actual touch and sympathy with the insurgent leaders, and that they are in secret aiding these leaders with information, supplies, etc., wherever possible. Officers will not be misled by the fact that officials of the pueblos pass ordinances inimical to those in insurrection, or by any action taken by them, either collectively or individually. The public acts of pueblo councils that are favorable to the Americans are usually negative by secret communication on the part of the parties enacting them to those in insurrection. Therefore, such acts cannot be taken as a guide in determining the friendship or lack of it of these officials for the American government.

Third. The taking of the oath of allegiance by officials, presidentes, vice-presidentes, consejeros, principales, tenientes of barrios, or other people of influence, does not indicate that they or any of them have espoused the American cause, since it is a well-established fact that these people frequently take the oath of allegiance with the direct object and intent of enabling them to be of greater service to their real friends in the field. In short, the loyalty of these people is to be determined only by acts which, when combined with their usual course of conduct, irrevocably binds them to the American cause.

Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time has now arrived when all natives in this brigade, who are not openly for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active friend, he is an open enemy.

Fourth. The most dangerous class with whom we have to deal is the wealthy sympathizer and contributor. This class comprises not only all those officials and principales above mentioned, but all those of importance who live in the pueblos with their families. By far the most important as well as the most dangerous member of this class is the native priest. He is most dangerous; and he is successful because he is usually the best informed, besides wielding an immense influence with the people by virtue of his position. He has much to lose, in his opinion, and but little to gain through American supremacy in these island.

It is expected that officers will exercise their best endeavors to suppress and prevent aid being given by the people of this class, especially by the native priests. Wherever there is evidence of this assistance, or where there is a strong suspicion that they are thus secretly aiding the enemies of our government, they will be confined and held. The profession of the priest will not prevent his arrest or proceedings against him. If the evidence is sufficient, they will be tried by the proper court. If there is not sufficient evidence to convict, they will be arrested and confined as a military necessity, and held as prisoners of war until released by orders from these headquarters.

It will be borne in mind that in these islands, as a rule, it is next to impossible to secure evidence against men of influence, and especially against the native priests, so long as they are at large. On the other hand, after they are arrested and confined, it is usually quite easy to secure abundant evidence against them. Officers in command of stations will not hesitate, therefore, to arrest and detain individuals whom they have good reasons to suspect are aiding the insurrection, even when positive evidence is lacking....

Others of his orders are counterparts of those issued by General Bell, the phraseology being the same.

Here, then, were several great provinces placed under the heel of two military officers, who started by assuming that the entire population was hostile, who regarded the most friendly behavior as especial evidence of hostility, who imparted their suspicions to their subordinates, urged them to act without consulting headquarters, and then began a campaign of reconcentration, devastation, and extermination. The only evidence of friendship that was to be accepted substantially was pointing out guns or insurgents, and the natives were to be subject to what General Bell calls once an "unsupportable" and once "intolerable" pressure.

Evidence thus obtained must be unreliable, as it always has been in every age and every country; and General Bell himself furnishes the proof in the following despatch:

Batangas, Jan. 9, 1902.

To All Station Commanders

Information reaching these headquarters indicates that the hardship and pressure which has been placed upon the people by the campaign has caused them, in seeking revenge or means of self-defence, to resort to their well-known expedient of false denunciation. Inasmuch as this custom is both a pernicious nuisance and might become a serious impediment to the success of military operations, commanding officers in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna will promptly bring to trial by provost court, for conduct prejudicial to good order and military operations, any person who makes a false denunciation, whenever it can be established to the satisfaction of the commanding officer that said false denunciation has been knowingly and viciously made for purposes of revenge, of self-defence, of clouding the real issue, of throwing discredit upon the transactions, motives, or testimony of material witnesses, or for any other purpose.

Inasmuch, however, as it is not intended to prevent or discourage the making of legitimate complaints, commanding officers will take great pains to investigate carefully and bring no one to trial until it has been clearly ascertained that they have made false denunciations knowingly and purposely, with vicious intent.

Any kind of defiance of the government or disloyal manifestations against measures adopted by it to put an end to insurrection, in this brigade, will be suppressed at once. These people must be taught the necessity for submission to the legally constituted authority, and this can be properly done in one way only, -- by firm and relentless repressive action.

J. F. Bell, Brigadier-general Commanding.

Who were the men who as commanding officers, or provost courts, held absolute sway over thousands of men? They were various subordinate officers, without judicial experience, unfamiliar with the language of the witnesses, and with every passion and prejudice inflamed against the people whom they were set to govern or try by such orders from their superiors as have been quoted.

This was carrying out President McKinley's standing order that

it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights which is the heritage of free peoples.

We have here concentration, devastation, the destruction of food and dwellings wherever found outside the "protected zones," killing, and every feature of the most barbarous war.

How such orders appear in the execution may be gathered from the following letter written to Senator Hoar by Clarence Clowe, of Seattle, on June 10, 1900, at a time when we were supposed to be pursuing "the magnanimous and benevolent policy" of which General Bell speaks in his order of December 13, 1902. It was about sixteen months after hostilities began.

At any time I am liable to be called upon to go out and bind and gag helpless prisoners, to strike them in the face, to knock them down when so bound, to bear them away from wife and children, at their very door, who are shrieking pitifully the while, or kneeling and kissing the hands of our officers, imploring mercy from those who seem not to know what it is, and then, with a crowd of soldiers, hold our helpless victim head downward in a tub of water in his own yard, or bind him hand and foot, attaching ropes to head and feet, and then lowering him into the depths of a well of water till life is well-nigh choked out, and the bitterness of a death is tasted, and our poor, gasping victims ask us for the poor boon of being finished off, in mercy to themselves.

All these things have been done at one time or another by our men, generally in cases of trying to obtain information as to the location of arms and ammunition.

Nor can it be said that there is any general repulsion on the part of the enlisted men to taking part in these doings. I regret to have to say that, on the contrary, the majority of soldiers take a keen delight in them, and rush with joy to the making of this latest development of a Roman holiday.

Secretary Root Approved this Policy

Yet Secretary Root approved all this. In his letter of May 7, 1902, to the president of the Senate, he says that the orders of General Bell of December 8, December 9, and December 13, were received by the department on January 17, 1902.

He says that these orders were "based upon," and were in strict conformity both with the letter and spirit of these instructions, that the War Department saw no reason to doubt that the policy embodied in the above-mentioned orders was at once the most effective and the most humane which could possibly be followed; and so, indeed, it has proved, since, as he says, the guerilla warfare in Batangas and Laguna and the adjacent regions has been ended, the authority of the United States has been asserted and acquiesced in, and the people who had been collected and protected in the camps of concentration have been permitted to return to their homes and resume their customary pursuits in peace.

Surely, an amazing sentence, when we remember that outside the camps their homes had been burned, and their food and other property destroyed or carried away in great part, if not wholly. Can such "devastation" as General Bell describes in his letter to General Wheaton be carried out and any home worth having be left? Literally, history repeats itself; and the American Secretary of War "makes a solitude, and calls it peace."

Secretary Root continues:

The War Department has not disapproved or interfered in any way with the orders giving effect to this policy; but has aided in their enforcement by directing an increase of food supply to the Philippines for the purpose of caring for the natives in the concentration camps.