WEAPONS OF WAR THE 6TH TRUMPET OF REVELATION!

From: http://www.princeaugust.ie/WW2/2111.html TURN YOUR SOUND DOWN IF YOU FIND IT DISTURBING IT IS MEANT TO BE THAT WAY compiled by Dee Finney

The 6th Trumpet Judgment (Revelation 9:13-21) is the destruction of 1/3 of mankind by 200 million demonic horsemen. Although the tendency is to interpret these horsemen with a modern parallel of military hardware, it will probably be as straightforward as the text seems to demand. The sixth trumpet, the second Woe! (9:13-21) Rev 9:13 The sixth angel sounded his trumpet, and I heard a voice coming from the horns of the golden altar that is before God.  14 It said to the sixth angel who had the trumpet, "Release the four angels who are bound at the great river Euphrates."  15 And the four angels who had been kept ready for this very hour and day and month and year were released to kill a third of mankind.  16 The number of the mounted troops was two hundred million. I heard their number.  17 The horses and riders I saw in my vision looked like this: Their breastplates were fiery red, dark blue, and yellow as sulphur. The heads of the horses resembled the heads of lions, and out of their mouths came fire, smoke and sulphur.  18 A third of mankind was killed by the three plagues of fire, smoke and sulphur that came out of their mouths.  19 The power of the horses was in their mouths and in their tails; for their tails were like snakes, having heads with which they inflict injury. 20 The rest of mankind that were not killed by these plagues still did not repent of the work of their hands; they did not stop worshipping demons, and idols of gold, silver, bronze, stone and wood--idols that cannot see or hear or walk.  21 Nor did they repent of their murders, their magic arts, their sexual immorality or their thefts. v13 - The sixth angel sounded his trumpet, and I heard a voice coming from the horns of the golden altar that is before God. - The golden altar is connected to the prayers of the saints (Rev 8:3). The sixth trumpet is in response to the prayers of the saints. For horn, see Lev 8:15, when Moses slaughtered the bull he took some of the blood with his finger and touched the horns of the altar to purify the altar. v14 - It said to the sixth angel who had the trumpet, "Release the four angels who are bound at the great river Euphrates" - The four angels are bound so they must evil, they are released at God's command, whose purpose is to get men to repent, see verses 20-21. The four angels cover each direction of the compass, the idea being that they are released to affect the whole earth. Compare these angels with the first four angels standing at the four corners of the earth, 7:1. The Euphrates marks the boundary between Israel and her enemies (Gen 15:18, Deu 1:7, Jos 1:4), Babylon which is on the Euphrates would be to the North of Israel and it is from the North that her enemies came (Jer 25:9, Ezek 26:7, 39:2). Compare this with the sixth bowl (Rev 16:12) in which the great river Euphrates, and its water was dried up to prepare the way for the kings of the East. Compare also with the four horsemen of the Apocalypse. v15 - And the four angels who had been kept ready for this very hour and day and month and year were released to kill a third of mankind. - The precise timing of their release indicates that they are under the divine control of God. Their purpose is to kill a third of mankind, no more no less, that is a limited number, because this is a warning to mankind. From the precise timing of their release this seems to be a specific event in history, and is therefore probably eschatological, in the light of the discussion in the next verse this event corresponds to the second coming (compare with Mat 24:36, Acts 1:7, Gen 7:11) or at least the final battle associated with it. Compare the sixth seal, sixth trumpet and sixth bowl, they all seem to refer to either the last battle or the second coming. v16 - The number of the mounted troops was two hundred million. I heard their number. - The troops are mounted, meaning that they are prepared for war. Two hundred million is a large number which he could not count, but he heard their number. Compare the description here with the chariots of God in Psa 68:17, the horses like a swarm of locusts in Jer 51:27 and the horses that fly like a vulture swooping to devour of Hab 1:8. In Joel the army invades mankind on the day of the Lord (Joel 2:11-11) as this is the sixth trumpet and the seventh trumpet depicts the handing over of the world to Christ, his eternal reign and the judgement, this vision corresponds to the last great battle (see Joel 3:1-2, 9-16). The last great battle is also found in Rev 16:14, 17:14, 19:17, 20:7. Note that the sixth seal also corresponds to the second coming (Rev 6:12). The sixth bowl refers to the battle on the great day of God Almighty (Rev 16:14) and the second coming is mentioned in the next verse (16:15). This is another example of the parallelism of the book. v17 - The horses and riders I saw in my vision looked like this: Their breastplates were fiery red, dark blue, and yellow as sulphur. The heads of the horses resembled the heads of lions, and out of their mouths came fire, smoke and sulphur. - Here is the only place in which John indicates that what he saw was in a vision. The breastplates had the same colours as the fire, smoke and sulphur which came out of the horses' mouths, see v18, this indicates the unified purpose of both horse and rider. Compare the lions' heads here with the lions' teeth of the locusts, this indicates strength. v18 - A third of mankind was killed by the three plagues of fire, smoke and sulphur that came out of their mouths.- This imagery seems to refers to war. The imagery like the locusts is similar to Joel 2:4-5, 'They have the appearance of horses; they gallop along like cavalry. With a noise like that of chariots they leap over the mountain tops, like a crackling fire consuming stubble, like a mighty army drawn up for battle.' Once again it is a limited number that is killed, a third of mankind is killed. Fire and sulphur remind us of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19:24, Luke 17:29), this was God's judgement on wickedness, a foretaste of hell (Jude 1:7 cf. Rev 14:10-11). v19 - The power of the horses was in their mouths and in their tails; for their tails were like snakes, having heads with which they inflict injury. - The snakes indicate their demonic origin, Luke 10:19. The three plagues of fire, smoke and sulphur came out of their mouths, v17, 18. Their tails also inflict injury. The word for snake (ophis) is the same word used to describe Satan in 12:9 (see also 12:14, 15, 20:2 cf. John 3:14, 2 Cor 11:3) v20 - The rest of mankind that were not killed by these plagues still did not repent of the work of their hands they did not stop worshipping demons, and idols of gold, silver, bronze, stone and wood--idols that cannot see or hear or walk. - Mankind is here accused of worshipping demons and in the fifth trumpet they are plagued by demons and possibly also in the sixth trumpet, the warning fits the sin. Later we find mankind worshipping the dragon and the beast (13:4) and his image (13:15) that is idolatry. The plagues are directed at unrepentant mankind, not at God's people, those who survive these plagues still did not repent. Some are killed by these plagues but to the rest they are warnings to man to repent. Consider Jesus reaction to the persecution of the Jews by Pilate or to those who died when the tower fell on those in Siloam (Luke 13:1-5) his reaction was to say to the people 'do you think they were more guilty than all the others living in Jerusalem? I tell you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish.' Despite the warning plagues from God, some natural some not, man refuses to worship God and give him the glory as Creator, Amos 4:10. First man is guilty of idolatry, worshipping created things not the Creator, Rom 1:23. He breaks the first tablet of the law (Ex 20:3-11, Deu 5:7, 2 King 17:35-39) rather than worship the creator (Rev 14:7). The stupidity of idolatry is emphasised by the phase 'idols that cannot see or hear or walk' in contrast to the living creator God, Dan 5:23, Psa 115:4-5, Jer 10:5. This hammers home the point that despite these plagues mankind prefers to worship created things rather than God, the message of Revelation is that mankind is to worship God and Him alone. Consider the worship of the living creatures and the elders of the Creator God, 4:8-11; the worship of the Lamb, 5:8 ff.; all the inhabitants of the earth worship the beast, 13:8 (compare the worship of demons and idols here with the worship of the beast and his image in 13:8, 15). Consider also the message of the first angel flying in mid-air proclaiming the eternal gospel which is to fear God and give him glory and to worship him as Creator, 14:6-7; consider the dire warning to those who worship the beast and his image in 14:9-11. Twice John is rebuked because he worshipped an angel (19:10, 22:8) and is told to worship God. In the case of the church at Pergamum and Thyatira eating food offered to idols is condemned (2:14, 20). Note that in 21:8 the place of idolaters is in the fiery lake of burning sulphur, we should therefore see the trumpets as agents of God's mercy rather than wrath, despite the fact that people do not repent. Notice the response of those at Ephesus who practised sorcery, they publicly burned their books on sorcery; it is better to burn ones books on the occult than to burn in the lake of fire. God's decree in Deu 7:5, 12:3 is to break down the altars, smash the sacred stones and burn the idols in the fire, see Josiah's response in 2 Kings 23 who did as described in Deuteronomy. v21 - Nor did they repent of their murders, their magic arts, their sexual immorality or their thefts - This is the first indictment against mankind, they did not repent, see also: Rev 11:18, Rev 14:7, Rev 14:9-11, Rev 16:5-6, Rev 16:8-11. Having rejected God as creator mankind now inevitably breaks the second tablet of the law (Deu 5:17 and Rom 1:24, 28). The punishment is indicated in Rev 21:8, their (murderers, the sexually immoral, those who practise magic arts) lot will be in the lake of burning sulphur. Trumpet 6: Deadly Attack The voice instructs the angel with the sixth trumpet to release the “four angels which are bound in the great river Euphrates” (verse 14). Since they are bound, they must be fallen angels or demons. Their release is by divine permission only and is intended to allow them to function as agents of God’s wrath. While some prefer to view this invading horde as demons, I believe they are an actual army. The battles that follow involve killing men, and the attackers are described as men (verses 16-18). The weapons with “breastplates of fire” could well be modern weapons. The “breastplates of fire” and the “fire and smoke” that shoot out of both ends of these vehicles certainly sound like tanks, airplanes or some modern weaponry. If John really saw the future, including the great end-time wars, he would have witnessed things he could hardly understand, let alone describe. Tanks, guns, flamethrowers and laser beams all fit these possible designations. While the horde of demons is unleashed to torture and afflict men, the horde of soldiers is unleashed to attack them as well. See:  http://www.greatdreams.com/war/weapons_of_war.htm

Battle of Dien Bien Phu Part of the First Indochina War French Union paratroopers dropping from a "Flying Boxcar". Date March 13 – May 7, 1954 Location 21°23′13″N 103°0′56″E / 21.38694°N 103.01556°E / 21.38694; 103.01556Coordinates: 21°23′13″N 103°0′56″E / 21.38694°N 103.01556°E / 21.38694; 103.01556 Vicinity of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam Result Decisive Viet Minh victory Belligerents French Union   France State of Vietnam Hmong mercenaries Viet Minh   Chinese military advisors[1] Commanders Christian de Castries # Pierre Langlais # René Cogny Võ Nguyên Giáp Strength As of March 13: 10,800[2] As of March 13: 48,000 combat personnel 15,000 logistical support personnel[3] Casualties and losses 2,293 dead 5,195 wounded   1,729 missing [4] 11,721 captured[5] [8,290 POW dead after battle[6] Vietnamese figures 4,020 dead 9,118 wounded 792 missing[7] French estimates 23,000[8]

First Indochina War   Hanoi – Cao Bang – Nam Dinh – Papillon – Lea – Valentine – Onoine – Pegase – Dong Khe – RC4 – Vinh Yen – Mao Khe – Hoa Binh – Lorraine – Na San – Bretagne – Atlante – Adolphe – Camargue – Hirondelle – Brochet – Mouette – Castor – Dien Bien Phu – Condor – Mang Yang Pass

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (French: Bataille de Diên Biên Phu; Vietnamese: Chiến dịch Điện Biên Phủ) was the climactic confrontation of the First Indochina War between the French Union's French Far East Expeditionary Corps and Viet Minh communist revolutionaries. The battle occurred between March and May 1954 and culminated in a comprehensive French defeat that influenced negotiations over the future of Indochina at Geneva. Military historian Martin Windrow wrote that Điện Biên Phủ was "the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized and equipped army able to defeat a modern Western occupier in pitched battle."^[9]

As a result of blunders by the French , the French began an operation to cut off the soldiers at Điện Biên Phủ, deep in the hills of northwestern Vietnam. Its purpose was to cut off Viet Minh supply lines into the neighboring Kingdom of Laos, a French ally, and tactically draw the Viet Minh into a major confrontation that would cripple them. Instead, the Viet Minh, under Senior General Võ Nguyên Giáp, surrounded and besieged the French, who were unaware of the Viet Minh's possession of heavy artillery (including anti-aircraft guns) and, more importantly, their ability to move such weapons through extremely difficult terrain to the mountain crests overlooking the French encampment. The Viet Minh occupied the highlands around Điện Biên Phủ and were able to accurately bombard French positions at will. Tenacious fighting on the ground ensued, reminiscent of the trench warfare of World War I. The French repeatedly repulsed Viet Minh assaults on their positions. Supplies and reinforcements were delivered by air, though as the French positions were overrun and the anti-aircraft fire took its toll, fewer and fewer of those supplies reached them. After a two-month siege, the garrison was overrun and most French forces surrendered, only a few successfully escaping to Laos.

Shortly after the battle, the war ended with the 1954 Geneva Accords, under which France agreed to withdraw from its former Indochinese colonies. The accords partitioned Vietnam in two; fighting later broke out among rival Vietnamese forces in 1959 resulting the Vietnam (Second Indochina) War.

Background and preparations

By 1953, the First Indochina War was not going well for France. A succession of commanders—Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque, Jean-Étienne Valluy, Roger Blaizot, Marcel Carpentier, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and Raoul Salan—had proven incapable of suppressing the Viet Minh insurrection. During their 1952–53 campaign, the Viet Minh had overrun vast swaths of Laos, a French ally and Vietnam's western neighbor, advancing as far as Luang Prabang and the Plain of Jars. The French were unable to slow the Viet Minh advance, and the Viet Minh fell back only after outrunning their always-tenuous supply lines. In 1953, the French had begun to strengthen their defenses in the Hanoi delta region to prepare for a series of offensives against Viet Minh staging areas in northwest Vietnam. They had set up fortified towns and outposts in the area, including Lai Chau near the Chinese border to the north,^[10] Na San to the west of Hanoi,^[11] and the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.^[12]

In May 1953, French Premier Rene Mayer appointed Henri Navarre, a trusted colleague, to take command of French Union Forces in Indochina. Mayer had given Navarre a single order—to create military conditions that would lead to an "honorable political solution."^[13] On arrival, Navarre was shocked by what he found. There had been no long-range plan since de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day, reactive basis. Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy moves or threats. There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization and build up the equipment of the Expeditionary force. Finally, Navarre, the intellectual, the cold and professional soldier, was shocked by the 'school's out' attitude of Salan and his senior commanders and staff officers. They were going home, not as victors or heroes, but then, not as clear losers either. To them the important thing was that they were getting out of Indochina with their reputations frayed, but intact. They gave little thought to, or concern for, the problems of their successors."^[13]

 Defense of Laos

The most controversial issue surrounding the battle is whether Navarre was also obligated to defend Laos, which was far from the French seat of military power in Hanoi. Although Navarre assumed it was his responsibility, defending it would require his army to operate far from its home base. During meetings with France's National Defense Committee on July 17 and July 24, Navarre asked if he was responsible for defending northern Laos.^[14] These meetings produced a misunderstanding that became the most disputed fact of the controversy surrounding the battle. For years afterwards, Navarre insisted the committee had reached no consensus; French Premier Joseph Laniel insisted that, at that meeting, the Committee had instructed Navarre to abandon Laos if necessary. "On this key issue, the evidence supports Navarre's claim that on July 24, he was given no clear-cut decision regarding his responsibility for Laos. Over the years, when challenged by Navarre, Laniel has never been able to present any written evidence to support his contention that Navarre was instructed to abandon Laos if necessary."^[14] The committee was reluctant to give Navarre a definitive answer because its proceedings were constantly leaked to the press, and the politicians on the committee did not want to take a politically damaging position on the issue.^[14]

Na San and the hedgehog concept

Simultaneously, Navarre had been searching for a way to stop the Viet Minh threat to Laos. Colonel Louis Berteil, commander of Mobile Group 7 and Navarre's main planner,^[15] formulated the "hérisson" (hedgehog) concept. The French army would establish a fortified airhead by air-lifting soldiers adjacent to a key Viet Minh supply line to Laos.^[16] This would effectively cut off Viet Minh soldiers fighting in Laos and force them to withdraw. "It was an attempt to interdict the enemy's rear area, to stop the flow of supplies and reinforcements, to establish a redoubt in the enemy's rear and disrupt his lines"^[17]

The hedgehog concept was based on French experiences at the Battle of Na San. In late November and early December 1952, Giap attacked the French outpost at Na San. Na San was essentially an "air-land base", a fortified camp supplied only by air.^[18] Giap's forces were beaten back repeatedly with very heavy losses. The French hoped that by repeating the strategy on a much larger scale, they would be able to lure Giap into committing the bulk of his forces in a massed assault. This would enable superior French artillery, armor, and air support to decimate the exposed Viet Minh forces. The experience at Na San convinced Navarre of the viability of the fortified airhead concept.

French staff officers disastrously failed to treat seriously several crucial differences between Điện Biên Phủ and Na San. First, at Na San, the French commanded most of the high ground with overwhelming artillery support.^[19] At Điện Biên Phủ, however, the Viet Minh controlled much of the high ground around the valley, their artillery far exceeded French expectations and they outnumbered the French four-to-one.^[2] Giap compared Điện Biên Phủ to a "rice bowl", where his troops occupied the edge and the French the bottom. Second, Giap made a mistake in Na San by committing his forces into reckless frontal attacks before being fully prepared. At Điện Biên Phủ, Giap would spend months meticulously stockpiling ammunition and emplacing heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns before making his move. Teams of Viet Minh volunteers were sent into the French camp to scout the disposition of the French artillery. Wooden artillery pieces were built as decoys and the real guns were rotated every few salvos to confuse French counterbattery fire. As a result, when the battle finally began, the Viet Minh knew exactly where the French artillery were, while the French were not even aware of how many guns Giap possessed. Third, the aerial resupply lines at Na San were never severed despite Viet Minh anti-aircraft fire. At Điện Biên Phủ, Giap amassed anti-aircraft batteries that quickly shut down the runway and made it extremely difficult and costly for the French to bring in reinforcements.

 Lead up to Castor

In June , Major General René Cogny, commander of the Tonkin Delta, proposed Điện Biên Phủ, which had an old airstrip built by the Japanese during World War II, as a "mooring point".^[20] In another misunderstanding, Cogny had envisioned a lightly defended point from which to launch raids; however, to Navarre, this meant a heavily fortified base capable of withstanding a siege. Navarre selected Điện Biên Phủ for the location of Berteil's "hedgehog". When presented with the plan, every major subordinate officer protested—Colonel Jean-Louis Nicot, (commander of the French Air transport fleet), Cogny, and generals Jean Gilles and Jean Dechaux (the ground and air commanders for Operation Castor, the initial airborne assault on Dien Bien Phu). Cogny pointed out, presciently, that "we are running the risk of a new Na San under worse conditions"^[21] Navarre rejected the criticisms of his proposal, and concluded a November 17 conference by declaring the operation would commence three days later, on November 20, 1953.^[22][23]

Navarre decided to go ahead with the operation, despite operational difficulties which would later become painfully obvious (but at the time may have been less apparent)^[24] because he had been repeatedly assured by his intelligence officers that the operation had very little risk of involvement by a strong enemy force.^[25] Navarre had previously considered three other ways to defend Laos: mobile warfare, which was impossible given the terrain in Vietnam; a static defense line stretching to Laos, which was not executable given the number of troops at Navarre's disposal; or placing troops in the Laotian capitals and supplying them by air, which was unworkable due to the distance from Hanoi to Luang Prabang and Vientiane.^[26] Thus, the only option left to Navarre was the hedgehog option, which he characterized as "a mediocre solution."^[27]

In a twist of fate, the French National Defense Committee ultimately did agree that Navarre's responsibility did not include defending Laos. However, their decision (which was drawn up on November 13) was not delivered to him until December 4, two weeks after the Điện Biên Phủ operation began.^[14]

 Establishment of the airhead

Operations at Điện Biên Phủ began at 10:35 on the morning of November 20, 1953. In Operation Castor, the French dropped or flew 9,000 troops into the area over three days. They were landed at three drop zones: Natasha, northwest of Điện Biên Phủ; Octavie, southwest of Điện Biên Phủ; and Simone, southeast of Điện Biên Phủ.^[28]

The Viet Minh elite 148th Independent Infantry Regiment, headquartered at Điện Biên Phủ, reacted "instantly and effectively"; three of their four battalions, however, were absent that day.^[29] Initial operations proceeded well for the French. By the end of November, six parachute battalions had been landed and the French were consolidating their positions.

It was at this time that Giap began his counter-moves. Giap had expected an attack, but could not foresee when or where it would occur. Giap realized that, if pressed, the French would abandon Lai Chau Province and fight a pitched battle at Điện Biên Phủ.^[30] On November 24, Giap ordered the 148th Infantry Regiment and the 316th division to attack Lai Chau, while the 308th, 312th, and 351st divisions assault Điện Biên Phủ from Viet Bac .^[30]

Starting in December, the French, under the command of Colonel Christian de Castries, began transforming their anchoring point into a fortress by setting up seven positions, each allegedly named after a former mistress of de Castries, although the allegation is probably unfounded, as the names simply begin with the first eight letters of the alphabet. The fortified headquarters was centrally located, with positions "Huguette" to the west, "Claudine" to the south, and "Dominique" to the northeast. Other positions were "Anne-Marie" to the northwest, "Beatrice" to the northeast, "Gabrielle" to the north and "Isabelle" four miles (6 km) to the south, covering the reserve airstrip. The choice of de Castries as the on-scene commander at Dien Bien Phu was, in retrospect, a bad one. Navarre had picked de Castries, a cavalryman in the 18th century tradition,^[31] because Navarre envisioned Điện Biên Phủ as a mobile battle. In reality, Điện Biên Phủ required someone adept at World War I-style trench warfare, something for which de Castries was not suited.^[32]

The arrival of the 316th Viet Minh division prompted Cogny to order the evacuation of the Lai Chau garrison to Điện Biên Phủ, exactly as Giap had anticipated. En route, they were virtually annihilated by the Viet Minh. "Of the 2,100 men who left Lai Chau on December 9, only 185 made it to Điện Biên Phủ on December 22. The rest had been killed or captured or deserted."^[33] The Viet Minh troops now converged on Điện Biên Phủ.

The French had committed 10,800 troops, with more reinforcements totaling nearly 16,000 men, to the defense of a monsoon-affected valley surrounded by heavily wooded hills that had not been secured. Artillery as well as ten M24 Chaffee light tanks and numerous aircraft were committed to the garrison. The garrison comprised French regular troops (notably elite paratroop units plus artillery), Foreign Legionnaires, Algerian and Moroccan tirailleurs, and locally recruited Indochinese infantry.

All told, the Viet Minh had moved 50,000 regular troops into the hills surrounding the valley, totaling five divisions including the 351st Heavy Division which was made up entirely of heavy artillery.^[3] Artillery and AA guns, which outnumbered the French artillery by about four to one,^[3] were moved into camouflaged positions overlooking the valley. The French came under sporadic Viet Minh artillery fire for the first time on January 31, 1954, and patrols encountered the Viet Minh in all directions. The battle had been joined, and the French were now surrounded.

 Combat operations

 Beatrice

The fighting began at 5:00 PM on March 13 when the Viet Minh launched a massive surprise artillery barrage. The time and date were carefully chosen—the hour allowed the artillery to fire in daylight, and the date was chosen because it was a new moon, allowing a nighttime infantry attack.^[34] The attack concentrated on position Beatrice, defended by the 3rd battalion of the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade.

Unknown to the French, the Viet Minh had made a minutely detailed study of Beatrice, and had rehearsed assaulting it using scaled models. According to one Viet Minh major: "Every evening, we came up and took the opportunity to cut barbed wire and remove mines. Our jumping-off point was moved up to only two hundred yards from the peaks of Beatrice, and to our surprise [French] artillery didn't know where we were".^[35]

The French command on Beatrice was decimated at 6:15 PM when a shell hit the French command post, killing Legionnaire commander Major Paul Pegot and his entire staff. A few minutes later, Colonel Jules Gaucher, commander of the entire northern sector, was also killed by Viet Minh artillery.

French resistance on Beatrice collapsed shortly after midnight following a fierce battle. Roughly 500 legionnaires were killed, along with 600 Viet Minh killed and 1,200 wounded from the 312th division.^[36] The French launched a counter-attack against Beatrice the following morning, but it was quickly beaten back by Viet Minh artillery. Despite their losses, the victory at Beatrice "galvanized the morale" of the Viet Minh troops.^[36]

Much to French disbelief, the Viet Minh had employed direct artillery fire, in which each gun crew does its own artillery spotting (as opposed to indirect fire, in which guns are massed farther away from the target, out of direct line of sight, and rely on a forward artillery spotter). Indirect artillery, generally held as being far superior to direct fire, requires experienced, well-trained crews and good communications which the Viet Minh lacked.^[37] Navarre wrote that "Under the influence of Chinese advisers, the Viet Minh commanders had used processes quite different from the classic methods. The artillery had been dug in by single pieces... They were installed in shell-proof dugouts, and fire point-blank from portholes... This way of using artillery and AA guns was possible only with the expansive ant holes at the disposal of the Vietminh and was to make shambles of all the estimates of our own artillerymen."^[38] The French artillery commander, Colonel Charles Piroth, distraught at his inability to bring counterfire on the well-camouflaged Viet Minh batteries, went into his dugout and killed himself with a hand grenade.^[39] He was buried there in great secrecy to prevent loss of morale among the French troops.

 Gabrielle

Following a four hour cease fire on the morning of March 14, Viet Minh artillery resumed pounding French positions. The air strip was put out of commission, forcing the French to deliver all supplies by parachute.^[40] That night, the Viet Minh launched an attack on Gabrielle, held by an elite Algerian battalion. The attack began with a concentrated artillery barrage at 5:00 PM. Two regiments from the crack 308th division attacked starting at 8:00 PM. At 4:00 AM the following morning, a Viet Minh artillery shell hit the battalion headquarters, severely wounding the battalion commander and most of his staff.^[40]

De Castries ordered a counterattack to relieve Gabrielle. However, Colonel Pierre Langlais, in forming the counterattack, chose to rely on the 5th Vietnamese Parachute battalion, which had jumped in the day before and was exhausted.^[41] Although some elements of the counterattack reached Gabrielle, most were paralyzed by the Viet Minh artillery and took heavy losses. At 8:00 AM the next day, the Algerian battalion fell back, abandoning Gabrielle to the Viet Minh. The French lost around 1,000 men defending Gabrielle, and the Viet Minh between 1,000 and 2,000.^[41]

 Anne-Marie

Anne-Marie was defended by T'ai troops, members of a Vietnamese ethnic minority loyal to the French. For weeks, Giap had distributed subversive propaganda leaflets, telling the T'ais that this was not their fight. The fall of Beatrice and Gabrielle had severely demoralized them. On the morning of March 17, under the cover of a fog, the bulk of the T'ais left or defected. The French and the few remaining T'ais on Anne-Marie were then forced to withdraw.^[42]

Lull

March 17 through March 30 saw a lull in fighting. The Viet Minh further tightened the noose around the French central area (formed by the strongpoints Huguette, Dominique, Claudine, and Eliane), effectively cutting off Isabelle and its 1,809 personnel.^[43] During this lull, the French suffered from a serious crisis of command. "It had become painfully evident to the senior officers within the encircled garrison—and even to Cogny at Hanoi—that de Castries was incompetent to conduct the defense of Dien Bien Phu. Even more critical, after the fall of the northern outposts, he isolated himself in his bunker so that he had, in effect, relinquished his command authority."^[44] On March 17, Cogny attempted to fly into Dien Bien Phu and take command, but his plane was driven off by anti-aircraft fire. Cogny considered parachuting into the encircled garrison, but his staff talked him out of it.^[44]

De Castries' seclusion in his bunker, combined with his superiors' inability to replace him, created a leadership vacuum within the French command. On March 24, Colonel Langlais and his fellow paratroop commanders, all fully armed, confronted de Castries. They told de Castries that he would retain the appearance of command, but that Langlais would exercise it.^[45] De Castries accepted the arrangement without protest, although he did exercise some command functions thereafter.^[46]

The French aerial resupply was taking heavy losses from Viet Minh machine guns near the landing strip. On March 27, Hanoi air transport commander Nicot ordered that all supply deliveries be made from 6,500 feet (2,000 m) or higher; losses were expected to remain heavy.^[47] De Castries ordered an attack against the Viet Minh machine guns two miles (3 km) west of Dien Bien Phu. Remarkably, the attack was a complete success, with 350 Viet Minh soldiers killed and seventeen AA machine guns destroyed. French losses were only twenty soldiers.^[48]

 March 30 – April 5 assaults

The next phase of the battle saw more massed Viet Minh assaults against French positions in the central Dien Bien Phu area – at Eliane and Dominique in particular. Those two areas were held by five understrength battalions, composed of a mixture of Frenchmen, Legionnaires, Vietnamese, Africans, and T'ais.^[49] Giap planned to use the tactics from the Beatrice and Gabrielle skirmishes.

At 7:00 PM on March 30, the Viet Minh 312th division captured Dominique 1 and 2, making Dominique 3 the final outpost between the Viet Minh and the French general headquarters, as well as outflanking all positions east of the river.^[50] At this point, the French 4th colonial artillery regiment entered the fight, setting its 105 mm howitzers to zero elevation and firing directly on the Viet Minh attackers, blasting huge holes in their ranks. Another group of French, near the airfield, opened fire on the Viet Minh with anti-aircraft machine guns, forcing the Viet Minh to retreat.^[50]

The Viet Minh were more successful in their simultaneous attacks elsewhere. The 316th division captured Eliane 1 from its Moroccan defenders, and half of Eliane 2 by midnight.^[51] On the other side of Dien Bien Phu, the 308th attacked Huguette 7, and nearly succeeded in breaking through, but a French sergeant took charge of the defenders and sealed the breach.^[51]

Just after midnight on the 31st, the French launched a fierce counterattack against Eliane 2, and recaptured half of it. Langlais ordered another counterattack the following afternoon against Dominique 2 and Eliane 1, using virtually "everybody left in the garrison who could be trusted to fight."^[51] The counterattacks allowed the French to retake Dominique 2 and Eliane 1, but the Viet Minh launched their own renewed assault. The French, who were exhausted and without reserves, fell back from both positions late in the afternoon.^[52] Reinforcements were sent north from Isabelle, but were attacked en route and fell back to Isabelle.

Shortly after dark on the 31st, Langlais told Major Marcel Bigeard, who was leading the defense at Eliane, to fall back across the river. Bigeard refused, saying "As long as I have one man alive I won't let go of Eliane 4. Otherwise, Dien Bien Phu is done for."^[53] The night of the 31st, the 316th division attacked Eliane 2. Just as it appeared the French were about to be overrun, a few French tanks arrived, and helped push the Viet Minh back. Smaller attacks on Eliane 4 were also pushed back. The Viet Minh briefly captured Huguette 7, only to be pushed back by a French counterattack at dawn on the 1st.^[54]

Fighting continued in this manner over the next several nights. The Viet Minh repeatedly attacked Eliane 2, only to be beaten back. Repeated attempts to reinforce the French garrison by parachute drops were made, but had to be carried out by lone planes at irregular times to avoid excessive casualties from Viet Minh anti-aircraft fire.^[54] Some reinforcements did arrive, but not nearly enough to replace French casualties.

 Trench warfare

On April 5, after a long night of battle, French fighter-bombers and artillery inflicted particularly devastating losses on one Viet Minh regiment which was caught on open ground. At that point, Giap decided to change tactics. Although Giap still had the same objective – to overrun French defenses east of the river – he decided to employ entrenchment and sapping to try to achieve it.^[55]

April 10 saw the French attempt to retake Eliane 1. The loss of Eliane 1 eleven days earlier had posed a significant threat to Eliane 4, and the French wanted to eliminate that threat. The dawn attack, which Bigeard devised, was preceded by a short, massive artillery barrage, followed by small unit infiltration attacks, followed by mopping-up operations. Without realizing it, Bigeard had re-invented the infiltration tactics used with great success by Oskar von Hutier in World War I. Eliane 1 changed hands several times that day, but by the next morning the French had control of the strongpoint. The Viet Minh attempted to retake it on the evening of April 12, but were pushed back.^[56]

"At this point, the morale of the Viet Minh soldiers broke. The French intercepted radio messages which told of units refusing orders, and Communist prisoners said that they were told to advance or be shot by the officers and noncommissioned officers behind them."^[57] The extreme casualties they had suffered (6,000 killed, 8,000 to 10,000 wounded, and 2,500 captured) had taken a toll; worse, the Viet Minh lacked any effective medical service. "Nothing strikes at combat morale like the knowledge that if wounded, the soldier will go uncared for."^[58] To avert the crisis, Giap called in fresh reinforcements from Laos.

During the fighting at Eliane 1, on the other side of camp, the Viet Minh entrenchments had almost entirely surrounded Huguette 1 and 6. On April 11, the garrison of Huguette 1 attacked, and was joined by artillery from the garrison of Claudine. The goal was to resupply Huguette 6 with water and ammunition. The attacks were repeated on the night of the 14–15th and 16–17th. While they did succeed in getting some supplies through, the heavy casualties convinced Langlais to abandon Huguette 6. Following a failed attempt to link up, on April 18, the defenders at Huguette 6 made a daring break out, but only a few made it back to French lines.^[59][60] The Viet Minh repeated the isolation and probing attacks against Huguette 1, and overran it on the morning of April 22. With the fall of Huguette 1, the Viet Minh took control of more than 90% of the airfield, making accurate parachute drops impossible.^[61] This caused the landing zone to become perilously small, and effectively choked off much needed supplies.^[62] A French attack against Huguette 1 later that day was repulsed.

 Isabelle

Isabelle saw only desultory action until March 30, when the Viet Minh succeeded in isolating it and beating back the attempt to send reinforcements north. Following a massive artillery barrage against Isabelle on March 30, the Viet Minh began employing the same trench warfare tactics against Isabelle that they were using against the central camp. By the end of April, Isabelle had exhausted its water supply and was nearly out of ammunition.^[63]

 Final attacks

The Viet Minh launched a massed assault against the exhausted defenders on the night of May 1, overrunning Eliane 1, Dominique 3, and Huguette 5, although the French managed to beat back attacks on Eliane 2. On May 6, the Viet Minh launched another massed attack against Eliane 2. The attack included, for the first time, Katyusha rockets.^[36] The French also used an innovation. The French artillery fired with a "TOT" (Time On Target) attack, so that artillery rounds fired from different positions would strike on target at the same time.^[64] The barrage wiped out the assault wave. A few hours later that night, the Viet Minh detonated a mine shaft, blowing Eliane 2 up. The Viet Minh attacked again, and within a few hours had overrun the defenders.^[65]

On May 7, Giap ordered an all out attack against the remaining French units. At 5:00 PM, de Castries radioed French headquarters in Hanoi and talked with Cogny.

De Castries: "The Viets are everywhere. The situation is very grave. The combat is confused and goes on all about. I feel the end is approaching, but we will fight to the finish."
 

Cogny: "Well understood. You will fight to the end. It is out of the question to run up the white flag after your heroic resistance."^[31]

By nightfall, all French central positions had been captured. That night, the garrison at Isabelle made a breakout attempt. While the main body did not even escape the valley, about 70 troops out of 1,700 men in the garrison did escape to Laos.^[66]

 Aftermath

 Prisoners

On May 8, the Viet Minh counted 11,721 prisoners, of whom 4,436 were wounded.^[67] This was the greatest number the Viet Minh had ever captured: one-third of the total captured during the entire war. The prisoners were divided into groups. Able bodied soldiers were force-marched over 250 miles (400 km) to prison camps to the north and east,^[68] where they were intermingled with Viet Minh soldiers to discourage French bombing runs.^[69] Hundreds died of disease on the way. The wounded were given basic first aid until the Red Cross arrived, removed 858, and provided better aid to the remainder. Those wounded who were not evacuated by the Red Cross were sent into detention.^[70]

The prisoners, French survivors of the battle at Dien Bien Phu, were starved, beaten, and heaped with abuse, and many died.^[71] Of 10,863 survivors held as prisoners, only 3,290 were officially repatriated four months later.^[67] However, the losses figure may include the 3,013 prisoners of Indochinese origin whose eventual fate is unknown.^[72]

 Political ramifications

The garrison constituted roughly a tenth of the total French Union manpower in Indochina,^[73]. The defeat seriously weakened the position and prestige of the French as previously planned negotiations over the future of Indochina began.

The Geneva Conference (1954) opened on May 8, the day after the surrender of the garrison. Ho Chi Minh entered the conference on the opening day with the news of his troops' victory in the headlines. The resulting agreement temporarily partitioned Vietnam into two zones: the North was administered by the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam while the South was administered by the French-supported State of Vietnam. The last units of the French Union forces withdrew from Indo-China in 1956. This partition was supposed to be temporary, and the two zones were meant to be reunited through national elections in 1956. After the French withdrawal, the United States supported the southern government, under Emperor Bao Dai and Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, which opposed the Geneva agreement, and which claimed that Ho Chi Minh's forces from the North had been killing Northern patriots and terrorizing people both in the North and the South. The North was supported by both communist China and the Soviet Union. This dispute would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War).

France's defeat in Indochina seriously damaged its prestige elsewhere in their colonial empire, notably the North African territories from which many of the troops who fought at Dien Bien Phu had been recruited. In 1954, six months after the battle at Dien Bien Phu ended, the Algerian War started, and by 1956 both Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates had gained independence. A French board of inquiry, the Catroux Commission, would later investigated the defeat.

The battle was depicted in Dien Bien Phu, a 1992 docudrama film – with several autobiographical parts – in conjunction with the Vietnamese army by Dien Bien Phu veteran French director Pierre Schoendoerffer.

 American participation

According to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act the United States provided the French with material aid during the battle – aircraft (supplied by the USS Saipan), weapons, mechanics, twenty-four CIA/CAT pilots, and U.S. Air Force maintenance crews.^[74] The United States, however, intentionally avoided overt direct intervention. In February 1954, following French occupation of Dien Bien Phu but prior to the battle, Democratic senator Mike Mansfield asked United States Defense Secretary Charles Erwin Wilson whether the United States would send naval or air units if the French were subjected to greater pressure there, but Wilson replied that "for the moment there is no justification for raising United States aid above its present level". President Dwight D. Eisenhower also stated, "Nobody is more opposed to intervention than I am".^[74] On March 31, following the fall of Beatrice, Gabrielle, and Anne-Marie, a panel of U.S. Senators and House Representatives questioned the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, about the possibility of American involvement. Radford concluded that it was too late for the U.S. Air Force to save the French garrison. A proposal for direct intervention was unanimously voted down by the panel, which "concluded that intervention was a positive act of war".^[75]

The United States did covertly participate in the battle. Following a request for help from Henri Navarre, Radford provided two squadrons of B-26 Invader bomber aircraft to support the French. Subsequently, 37 American pilots flew 682 sorties over the course of the battle. Earlier, in order to succeed the pre-Dien Bien Phu Operation Castor of November 1953, General Chester McCarty made available 12 additional C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by French crews.^[76] Two of the American pilots, Wallace Buford and James McGovern, Jr., were killed in action during the siege of Dien Bien Phu.^[77] In February 25, 2005, the seven still living American pilots were awarded the French Legion of Honor by Jean-David Levitte, the French ambassador to the United States.^[76] The role that the American pilots played in this battle had remained little known until 2004. The "American historian Erik Kirsinger researched the case for more than a year to establish the facts."^[78][79] The French author Jules Roy also suggests that Admiral Radford discussed with the French the possibility of using nuclear weapons in support of the French garrison.^[80] Moreover, John Foster Dulles was reported to have mentioned the possibility of lending atomic bombs to the French for use at Dien Bien Phu,^[81] and a similar source claims that British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden was aware of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in that region.^[82]

 Khe Sanh

In January 1968, during the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Army (still under Giap's command) made an apparent attempt to repeat their success at Dien Bien Phu, by a siege and artillery bombardment on the U.S. Marine Corps infantry and artillery base at Khe Sanh, South Vietnam. Historians are divided on whether this was a genuine attempt to force the surrender of that Marine base, or else a diversion from the rest of the Tet Offensive, or an example of the North Vietnamese Army keeping its options open.

At Khe Sanh, a number of factors were significantly different from the siege of Dien Bien Phu. Khe Sanh was much closer to its supply base (45 km/28 mi versus 200 km/120 mi at Dien Bien Phu);^[83]

At Khe Sanh, the U.S. Marines held the high ground, and their artillery forced the North Vietnamese to use their own artillery from a much greater distance. On the other hand, at Dien Bien Phu, the French artillery (six 105 mm batteries and one battery of four 155 mm howitzers and mortars^[84]) were only sporadically effective;^[85] Khe Sanh received 18,000 tons in aerial resupplies during the 30-day battle, whereas during 167 days that the French forces at Dien Bien Phu held out, they received only 4,000 tons.^[85] By the end of the battle of Khe Sanh, U.S. Air Force warplanes had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223 tons of munitions on targets within the Khe Sanh area. U.S. Marine Corps warplanes had flown 7,098 missions and dropped 17,015 tons of munitions. U.S. Navy warplanes, many of which had been redirected from the Operation Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped 7,941 tons of ordnance on the enemy.

 Notes

 References

• Davidson, Phillip (1988). Vietnam at War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195067924. 
• "Dien Bien Phu". Spartacus Educational. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/VNdienbein.htm. Retrieved 2006-12-08. 
• "Ðiên Biên Phú – The "official and historical site" of the battle". http://www.dienbienphu.org. Retrieved 2006-12-08. 
• Fall, Bernard B. (1985). Hell in a Very Small Place. The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0306802317. 
• "The Fall of Dienbienphu". Time Magazine. 1954-05-17. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,860710,00.html. 
• Navarre, Henri (1958) (in French). Agonie de l'Indochine. Paris: Plon. OCLC 23431451. 
• Rottman, Gordon L. (2005). Khe Sanh (1967–1968) – Marines battle for Vietnam's vital hilltop base. Oxford: Osprey Publishing (UK). ISBN 1841768634. 
• Roy, Jules; Baldick, Robert. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper & Row. OCLC 263986. 
• Roy, Jules (2002). The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers. ISBN 0786709588. 
• Stone, David (2004). Dien Bien Phu. London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 1857533720. 
• Windrow, Martin (2004). The Last Valley. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0306813866. 

 External links

• Dien Bien Phu Site dedicated to the battle.
• Memorial-Indochine.org in English
• An Analysis of the French Defeat at Dien Bien Phu
• Airlift's Role at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh
• An interview with Vo Nguyen Giap
• Battle of Dien Bien Phu, an article by Bernard B. Fall
• Dien Bien Phu: A Battle Assessment by David Pennington
• "Peace" in a Very Small Place: Dien Bien Phu 50 Years Later by Bob Seals
• ANAPI's official website^{[dead link]} (National Association of Former POWs in Indochina)
• Bibliography: Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference

 Media links

Newsreels (video)

• (English) The News Magazine of the Screen (May 1954)
• (English) U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the fall of Dien Bien Phu (May 7th, 1954)
• (English) Dien Bien Phu Episode From Ten Thousand Day War Documentary

Retrospectives (video)

• (French) Testimonial of General Giap, 50 years after the battle (May 7th, 2004)
• (French) Testimonial of General Bigeard, 50 years after the battle (May 3rd, 2004)
• (French) Testimonial of Pierre Schoendoerffer, 50 years after the battle (May 5th, 2004)^{[dead link]}
• (French) Sample of "Dien Bien Phu", docudrama by Schoendoerffer (1991)

War reports (Picture galleries and captions)

• (French) Airborne Operation Castor and building of the Dien Bien Phu outpost (November 1953–February 1954)
• (French) Airforce in Dien Bien Phu (January–May 1954)
• (French) The battle of Dien Bien Phu (March–May 1954)

French Indochina   Background France-Asia relations · French colonial empire · France–Vietnam relations · France–Thailand relations · France–China relations   Events French assistance to Nguyen Anh (1777–1820) · Le Van Khoi revolt (1833–1835) · Bombardment of Tourane (1847) · Siege of Tourane (1858) · Cochinchina campaign (1858–62) · Tonkin campaign (1883–1886) · Sino-French War (1884–1885) · Pacification of Tonkin · Franco-Siamese War (1893) · World War I · 1916 Cochinchina uprising · Thai Nguyen uprising · Bazin assassination · Yen Bai mutiny · French–Thai War (1940–1941) · Japanese invasion of French Indochina · World War II · August Revolution · Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam · First Indochina War · Battle of Dien Bien Phu · Partition of Vietnam   Treaties Treaty of Versailles (1787) · Treaty of Saigon (1862) · Treaty of Hué (1863) · Treaty of Saigon (1874) · Treaty of Hué (1883) · Geneva Conference (1954)   French personalities Alexandre de Rhodes · Pigneau de Béhaine · Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau · Jean-Baptiste Cécille · Charles de Montigny · Charles Rigault de Genouilly · Amédée Courbet · Henri Rivière · Francis Garnier · Ernest Doudart de Lagrée · Auguste Pavie · Albert Sarraut   Organisations Paris Foreign Missions Society · Tonkin Expeditionary Corps · Tonkinese Rifles  · Governor-General of French Indochina

Vietnamese independence movement   Events Bombardment of Đà Nẵng · Capture of Saigon · Capture of the Citadel of Saigon · Colonization of Cochinchina · Ba Đình uprising · Pacification of Tonkin · Hanoi Poison Plot · World War I · 1916 Cochinchina uprising · Thái Nguyên uprising · Bazin assassination · Yên Bái mutiny · World War II · August Revolution · Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam · First Indochina War · Battle of Điện Biên Phủ · Geneva Conference   Organisations Cần Vương · Đông Du · Duy Tân Hội · Empire of Vietnam · Nguyễn Dynasty · Tonkin Free School · Vietnam Quang Phục Hội · Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng · Việt Minh   Vietnamese revolutionaries Cường Để · Đinh Công Tráng · Hồ Chí Minh · Huỳnh Thúc Kháng · Lương Văn Can · Ngô Đức Kế · Nguyễn An Ninh · Nguyễn Đình Chiểu · Nguyễn Quang Bích · Nguyễn Quyền · Nguyễn Thái Học · Nguyễn Thần Hiến · Nguyen Thanh · Nguyễn Thiện Thuật · Nguyễn Thượng Hiền · Nguyễn Trung Trực · Nguyễn Xuân Ôn · Phạm Bành · Phan Bội Châu · Phan Chu Trinh · Phan Đình Phùng · Phan Thanh Giản · Phan Xích Long · Tạ Thu Thâu · Tôn Thất Thuyết · Trần Cao Vân · Trần Trọng Kim · Trương Định   Emperors Tự Đức · Hàm Nghi · Thành Thái · Duy Tân · Bảo Đại   French rule Albert Sarraut · French Indochina (Governor-General)   Collaborators Hoàng Cao Khải · Hoàng Kế Viêm · Nguyen Than

posted April 16, 2009 8:28 pm Tomgram: William Astore, Déjà Vu All Over Again in Afghanistan. [Note to TomDispatch Readers: A reminder -- I'll be away and so unable to respond to letters or requests until next Monday or thereafter. Tom] It didn't take long. Only 11 days after Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, a Newsweek cover story proclaimed the Afghan War "Obama's Vietnam." And there wasn't even a question mark. As John Barry and Evan Thomas wrote grimly in that January piece, "There is this stark similarity: in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, we may now be facing a situation where we can win every battle and still not win the war -- at least not within a time frame and at a cost that is acceptable to the American people." In the two and a half months since that piece appeared, the President and his advisors have, in fact, doubled-down on what is increasingly the Af-Pak War -- with the expanding fighting in Pakistan's tribal borderlands helping to destabilize that regional nuclear power. As a result, it would hardly be surprising if "Obama's Vietnam" became an ever more common refrain in the year ahead. In a number of ways, however, the Af-Pak War couldn't bear less of a relationship to the Vietnam one. After all, this time around there is no superpower enemy like the Soviet Union or regional power like China supporting and arming the Taliban (or, for that matter, like the United States, which supported and armed the mujahideen to give the Soviets their own "Vietnam" in Afghanistan in the 1980s). In Vietnam, the U.S. faced a North Vietnamese professional army, well-trained, superbly disciplined, and supplied with the best the Soviets and Chinese could produce, including heavy weapons; while the guerrilla organization we fought in South Vietnam, which Americans knew as "the Vietcong," had widespread popular support, was unified, dedicated, well structured, and highly regimented. The "Taliban," on the other hand, is a rag-tag, under-armed set of largely localized militias adding up to only perhaps 10,000-15,000 armed fighters, loyal to a range of leaders, including the pre-2001 Taliban leadership headed by Mullah Omar, various former mujahideen commanders of the anti-Soviet War, or sometimes just local warlords. Even where firmly lodged itself, the Taliban's support in rural Afghanistan, as far as can be told from what opinion polls exist, is at best unenthusiastic, and based largely on its ability to bring some safety to rural areas the corrupt central government has no control over, and above all, on its ability to present itself as the only real opposition to a foreign military occupation of the country. Unlike the Vietnamese, the Taliban are largely incapable of bringing down American and NATO planes or helicopters, attacking big American bases, or massing for major offensives of any sort. While growing in strength by every measure available, what they are largely capable of doing, in military terms, is blowing things up via roadside bombs or suicide attacks (which is, of course, no small thing). As a result, American casualties, while serious and possibly due to rise this year (along with Afghan civilian casualties), are exceedingly modest if measured by a Vietnam-era yardstick. In other words, in scale, the Af-Pak War is unlikely ever to become a real "Vietnam" (Obama's or otherwise). Looked at another way, however, this war may have the capacity to inflict upon the U.S. the kind of defeat that the Vietnamese, for all their strength and nationalist fervor, were incapable of. In a sense, Af-Pak threatens to be, in the personalized terms the American media often favors, not "Obama's Vietnam," but "Obama's Afghanistan" -- that is, our version of the defeat we once helped inflict on the Russians which played a role in breaking the back of the Soviet empire. The U.S. suffered a genuine defeat in Vietnam and its army nearly collapsed in the process, but the American empire and the American economic system stood in no mortal danger from it. By the end of 2009, the cost of the Iraq War -- that is, of putting down another set of rag-tag insurgents -- will pass that of the Vietnam War and, in dollars spent, stand second only to World War II in U.S. history. Add to that the rising expense of a never-ending Af-Pak War and -- in the worst of economic times -- you have the equivalent of a vast financial hemorrhage, an economic sinkhole. In short, if "Obama's war" proves a "quagmire," it may not be a Vietnamese-style one. In one way, however, the Af-Pak War has borne, and continues to bear, a certain eerie resemblance to the Vietnam one: in the manner in which Americans have chosen to fight it. Not surprisingly, as retired lieutenant colonel and TomDispatch regular William Astore points out in the following striking piece, in this we resemble ourselves 40 years ago. As a result, for anyone who remembers Vietnam, much of our military's "new thinking" on counterinsurgency warfare, which has gotten such media praise, looks old and tired indeed. But let Astore take up the tale from here. Tom Mary McCarthy in Vietnam, Barack Obama in Afghanistan Seven Lessons and Many Questions for the President By William Astore In 1967, outraged by the course of the Vietnam War, as well as her country's role in prolonging and worsening it, Mary McCarthy, novelist, memoirist, and author of the bestseller The Group, went to Saigon, then the capital of South Vietnam, to judge the situation for herself. The next year, she went to the North Vietnamese capital, Hanoi. She wrote accounts of both journeys, published originally in pamphlet format as Vietnam (1967) and Hanoi (1968), and later gathered with her other writings on Vietnam as a book, The Seventeenth Degree (1974). As pamphlets, McCarthy's accounts sold poorly and passed into obscurity; deservedly so, some would say. Those who'd say this, however, would be wrong. McCarthy brought a novelist's keen eye to America's activities and its rhetoric in Vietnam. By no means a military expert, not even an expert on Vietnam -- she only made a conscious decision to study the war in Vietnam after she returned from her trip to Saigon -- her impressionistic writings were nevertheless insightful precisely because she had long been a critical thinker beholden to no authority. Her insights into our approach to war-fighting and to foreign cultures are as telling today as they were 40 years ago, so much so that President Obama and his advisors might do well to add her unconventional lessons to their all-too-conventional thinking on our spreading war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What were those lessons? Here are seven of them, each followed by questions that, four decades later, someone at President Obama's next press conference should consider asking him: 1. McCarthy's most fundamental objection was to the way, in Vietnam, the U.S. government decided to apply "technology and a superior power to a political situation that will not yield to this." At the very least, the United States was guilty of folly, but McCarthy went further. She condemned our technocentric and hegemonic form of warfare as "wicked" because of its "absolute indifference to the cost in human lives" to the Vietnamese people. Even in 1967, the widespread, at times indiscriminate, nature of American killing was well known. For example, U.S. planes dropped roughly 7 million tons of bombs on Vietnam and parts of Laos and Cambodia during the war, nearly five times the tonnage used against Germany during World War II. The U.S. even waged war on the Vietnamese jungle and forest, which so effectively hid Vietnamese guerrilla forces, spraying roughly 20 million gallons of toxic herbicides (including the dioxin-contaminated Agent Orange) on it. In her outrage, McCarthy dared to compare the seeming indifference of many of her fellow citizens toward the blunt-edged sword of technological destruction we had loosed on Vietnam to the moral obtuseness of ordinary Germans under Adolf Hitler. Questions for President Obama: Aren't we once again relying on the destructive power of technology to "solve" complex political and religious struggles? Aren't we yet again showing indifference to the human costs of war, especially when borne by non-Americans? Even though we're using far fewer bombs in the Af-Pak highlands than we did in Vietnam, aren't we still morally culpable when these "precision-guided munitions" miss their targets and instead claim innocents, or hit suspected "terrorists" who suddenly morph into wedding parties? In those cases, do we not seek false comfort in the phrase, C'est la guerre, or at least that modern equivalent: unavoidable collateral damage? 2. As Richard Nixon campaigned for the presidency in 1968 by calling for "peace with honor" in Vietnam, McCarthy offered her own warning about the dangers that arose when the office of the presidency collided with an American desire never to be labeled a loser: "The American so-called free-enterprise system, highly competitive, investment-conscious, expansionist, repels a loser policy by instinctive defense movements centering in the ganglia of the presidency. No matter what direction the incumbent, as candidate, was pointing in, he slowly pivots once he assumes office." Questions for President Obama: Have you, like Vietnam-era presidents, pivoted toward yet another surge simply to avoid the label of "loser" in Afghanistan? And if the cost of victory (however defined) is hundreds, or even thousands, more American military casualties, hundreds of billions of additional dollars spent, and extensive collateral damage and blowback, will this "victory" not be a pyrrhic one, achieved at a price so dear as to be indistinguishable from defeat? 3. Though critical of the U.S. military in Vietnam, McCarthy was even more critical of American civilian officials there. "On the whole," she wrote, they "behaved like a team of promoters with a dubious 'growth' stock they were brokering." At least military men were often more forthright than the civilians, if not necessarily more self-aware, McCarthy noted, because they were part of the war -- the product, so to speak -- not its salesmen. Questions for President Obama: In promising to send a new "surge" of State Department personnel and other civilians into Afghanistan, are you prepared as well to parse their words? Are you braced in case they sell you a false bill of goods, even if the sellers themselves, in their eagerness to speak fairy tales to power, continually ignore the Fantasyland nature of their tale? 4. Well before Bush administration officials boasted about creating their own reality and new "facts on the ground" in Iraq, Mary McCarthy recognized the danger of another type of "fact": "The more troops and matériel committed to Vietnam, the more retreat appears to be cut off -- not by an enemy, but by our own numbers. To call for withdrawal in the face of that commitment... is to seem to argue not against a policy, but against facts, which by their very nature are unanswerable." Questions for President Obama: If your surge in Afghanistan fails, will you be able to de-escalate as quickly as you escalated? Or will the fact that you've put more troops in harm's way (with all their equipment and all the money that will go into new base and airfield and road construction), and committed more of your prestige to prevailing, make it even harder to consider leaving? 5. A cursory reading of The Pentagon Papers, the famously secret government documents on Vietnam leaked to the New York Times by Daniel Ellsberg, reveals how skeptical America's top officials were, early on, in pursuing a military solution to the situation in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, knowing better, the "best and brightest," as journalist David Halberstam termed them in his famous, ironic book title, still talked themselves into it; and they did so, as McCarthy noted, because they set seemingly meaningful goals ("metrics" or "benchmarks," we'd say today), which they then convinced themselves they were actually achieving. When you trick yourself into believing that you're meeting your goals, as Halberstam noted, there's no reason to reexamine your course of action. Questions for President Obama: Much has been written about an internal struggle within your administration over the wisdom of surging in Afghanistan. Now, you, too, have called for the setting of "benchmarks" for your new strategy's success. Are you wise enough to set them to capture the complexities of political realities on the ground rather than playing to American strengths? Are you capable of re-examining them, even when your advisors assure you that they are being achieved? 6. In her day, Mary McCarthy recognized the inequities of burden-sharing at home when it came to the war in Vietnam: "Casualty figures, still low [in 1967], seldom strike home outside rural and low-income groups -- the silent part of society. The absence of sacrifices [among the privileged classes] has had its effect on the opposition [to the war], which feels no need, on the whole, to turn away from its habitual standards and practices -- what for? We have not withdrawn our sympathy from American power and from the way of life that is tied to it -- a connection that is more evident to a low-grade G.I. in Vietnam than to most American intellectuals." Questions for President Obama: Are you willing to listen to the common G.I. as well as to the generals who have your ear? Are you willing to insist on greater equity in burden-sharing, since once again most of the burden of Iraq and Afghanistan has fallen on "the silent part of society"? Are you able to recognize that the "best and brightest" in the corridors of power may not be the wisest exactly because they have so little to lose (and perhaps much to gain) from our "overseas contingency operations"? 7. McCarthy was remarkably perceptive when it came to the seductiveness of American technological prowess. Our technological superiority, she wrote, was a large part of "our willingness to get into Vietnam and stay there... The technological gap between us and the North Vietnamese constituted, we thought, an advantage which obliged us not to quit." Questions for President Obama: Rather than providing us with a war-winning edge, might our robot drones, satellite imagery, and all our other gadgetry of war seduce us into believing that we can "prevail" at a reasonable and sustainable cost? Indeed, do we think we should prevail precisely because our high-tech military brags of "full spectrum dominance"? One bonus lesson from Mary McCarthy before we take our leave of her: Even now, we speak too often of "Bush's war" or, more recently, "Obama's war." Before we start chattering mindlessly about Iraq and Afghanistan as American tragedies, we would do well to recall what McCarthy had to say about the war in Vietnam: "There is something distasteful," she wrote, "in the very notion of approaching [Vietnam] as an American tragedy, whose protagonist is a great suffering Texan [President Lyndon Baines Johnson]." Yes, there is something distasteful about a media that blithely refers to Bush's or Obama's war as hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghanis suffer. For American troops, after all, are not the only ones paying the ultimate price when the U.S. fights foreign wars for ill-considered reasons and misguided goals. William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), taught for six years at the Air Force Academy. A TomDispatch regular, he currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology and is the author of Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism (Potomac Press, 2005), among other works. He may be reached at wastore@pct.edu. Copyright 2009 William Astore Printer-Friendly Version